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A Comment on Meyers' Introduction to
Environmental Thought
A.

DAN TARLOCK*

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Second Circuit's landmark decision in Scenic Hudson
PreservationConference v. FPC, the concept of protection of "environmental values" had almost no legal meaning.2 Injury to an abstraction
labeled the "environment" or, in an attempt to appear more scientific,
an "ecosystem" was an unrecognized category of legal harm. Activities
which interfere with the productive use of a natural resource have, of
course, long been subject to liability.' Since Scenic Hudson, there has
been an astonishing judicial and legislative recognition of environmental
values. Airsheds and water bodies are protected from the discharge of
residuals and chemical pesticides by legislation and regulations which
may rival the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. Under the spur
of the courts and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, all
federal agencies have been forced to consider environmental values in
* A.B. 1963, LL.B. 1965, Stanford University; Professor of Law, Indiana University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, 1974-75.
1354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). The court reversed
the Federal Power Commission's award of a license for a pumped storage facility and
remanded for further proceedings on the grounds the Commission had failed to consider
adequately the environmental impact of the project.
2 See Atkeson, Introduction, to ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDuAL E vnlmoNMENTAL LAW 1 (E. Dolgin & G. Guilbert eds. 1974).
3
Courts have sometimes awarded damages and injunctive relief when an activity
has impaired another person's ability to continue to enjoy a legally protected productive
use of a resource, e.g., Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St.
Helens, 160 Ore. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939) ; and the doctrines of nuisance, trespass, and
strict liability have long allowed property owners relief against activities which interfered with the use and enjoyment of their land. However, the alleged injuries in many
important environmental lawsuits go beyond allegations that an activity impairs or
threatens to impair a human use of a resource, as the concept of use has traditionally
been understood. Many of these suits, reflecting recent legislation, are concerned with
activities which pose unquantifiable risks because of ecosystem modification. Sometimes,
but not always, the necessity to prevent or at least minimize the risk of future modification or change is linked to human uses of the resource, but the beneficiaries of the risk

prevention are often identified as future generations rather than foreseeable users. Some
have recently argued that the allegation that future generations must be protected is a
fiction and that the real function of the creation of environmental rights is to protect
natural systems per se. See C. SToNE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? (1974). For an
iarlier argument reaching the same conclusions through Chinese thought see Morris,
The Rights and Duties of Beasts and Trees: A Law Teacher's Essay for Landscape
Architects, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 185 (1964).
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situations ranging from the construction of large public works to the
approval of a freight rate.4 Many states are now enacting little NEPA's
and similar statutes. In brief, environmental impact is now a dimension
that must be considered in most resource use conflicts at all levels of
government. Yet despite hundreds of recent decisions, new statutes
and regulations, there is little consensus as to the content of the environmental values which are being protected and cn the weight which
they should be given vis-A-vis other competing values such as economic
development. This is not surprising, since environmental law has
developed in the best traditions of the common law: A sued B because A
did not like what B was doing. Scenic Hudson perfectly illustrates this
and is the paradigm environmental law suit: a group of elite environmental groups sued a utility, by contesting an FPC license, to prevent
construction of a pumped water storage plant on the Hudson River on
the grounds it would mar the scenic beauty of a unique natural area
and disrupt an ecosystem.
The genius of the common law is that the content of protected
interests can never be precisely defined because the range of interests is
always in the process of evolution. However, the necessity to define
more precisely the content of what is being protected under the labels
"environment" or "environmental values" is now apparent as the recognition of these values becomes increasingly widespread and these
values come more sharply into conflict with other societal values. In the
past ten years most environmental law suits have sought to establish the
principle that public and, to a lesser extent, private decisionmakers should
take, in Judge Leventhal's phrase, "a hard look '" at the environmental
implications of an activity or decision. This was necessary because
environmental values were often ignored or given insufficient weight,
but NEPA and other statutes as well as a "common law" of judicial
review of administrative action now require that environmental information be displayed and considered in a wide range of situations.
Federal appellate courts have been slowly construing NEPA to impose
an appellate model on decisionmaking.6 Not only have agencies been
required to produce information to support their activities, they have
4Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972); SCRAP v. United States, 6 E.R.C. 1305 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 1974).
5Leventhal, Environmental Decisioninaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 509, 511 (1974).
6Judge Leventhal has described the function of judicial review of impact statements

as "close judicial scrutiny . . .to see that it fully discloses and analyzes the environmental impacts of the proposed action; that it lays bare alternatives to the proposed action . . .; and more generally, in the vernacular, that it all hangs together and makes
elementary good sense." Id. at 525.
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been required to justify the choices they make by a showing that a
wide range of information and alternatives were systematically considered. To date, NEPA has been construed primarily as mandating
new processes of decision since it does not assign relative weights to
environmental values,7 and thus courts have been reluctant to invalidate
decisions which involve a choice between environmental and other values
so long as the choice was made in good faith. In short, a choice is
valid so long as it is accompanied by sufficient anguish. To lawyers and
judges a commitment to a restructured process is in theory a commitment to rationality in the abstract. A choice is good because of the
way it is made rather than the resource use preferences it represents.
However, as is well known, this is too simplistic a view of the force
of process and its relation to the development of new substantive rules.
At the heart of environmental controversies is a struggle for power,
and processes are used to effectuate transfers of power.' Much environmental litigation and legislation seeks to supplant this country's existing
philosophies of resource use-exploitation spread over a fairly limited
time horizon to balance the present against the future valuation of the
resources-with a new and profoundly radical set of first principles,
rather than simply to elevate environmental values to equal dignity with
developmental ones.
A commitment to a process, such as environmental impact assessment, which requires that more substantial reasons be given for decisions
than were previously required, is inevitably a commitment to the recognition of new substantive values. The decision to require reasons
requires the decisionmaker to distinguish among relevant and irrelevant
explanations, and eventually, in a very uneven fashion, previous justifications are rejected as untenable.
The issue the legal system must now resolve is the weight which
should be given to environmental considerations, and to answer this
some understanding of the philosophical arguments which form the
basis for the current recognition of environmental values as a legitimate
source of legal rights is necessary. Following Roscoe Pound's theory
that the law does not create but recognizes interests,9 Professor Charles
7
See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th
Cir. 1974) (NEPA does not require the agency to articulate a scheme of values before
environmental
and developmental values can be traded off).
8
See J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTIoN
(1971).
9 "A legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, individual, public
and social. . ..
It does not create these interests . . . it only recognizes them." R.
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 91-92 (1921). Cf. E. HAEFELE, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 136 (1973).
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J. Meyers, in his article, has sought to trace the philosophical roots of
the current recognition of environmental values. As one who has
been engaged in the same activity for the past few years, I marvel at
Professor Meyers' courage in attempting to isolate the most important
arguments and to present a synthesis in a relatively few pages. The
sources of our attitudes toward the biosphere have their foundation in
the most profound ideas of Western culture, and to unravel the diverse
influences is a lifetime task for any one scholar.1" Nonetheless Professor
Meyers succeeds with his usual brevity and clarity in describing and,
more importantly, criticizing the major philosophical influences on our
legal system's response to societal demands for increased levels of environmental quality. In these comments I will suggest some of the implications of his major conclusions, briefly indicate the alternative
approaches Professor Meyers rejects, and suggest some of the implications his analysis has for the development of new legal doctrines.
NATURE AND WILDERNESS PHILOSOPHY

The first topic addressed by Professor Meyers is the contemporary
significance of the nature and wilderness preservation movement. Preservation of natural as well as manmade environments to reinforce our
presumed moral and cultural heritage, or more often simply to assert
aesthetic values, is a strong force in contemporary environmental thinking. The idea of preserving wilderness is a recent idea in Western and
especially American culture, as Professor Meyers accurately demonstrates, and is no longer confined as it originally was to preserving vast
tracts of remote uninhabited lands. Every remotely interesting building or meadow or wood is a fit subject for preservation for the same
reasons remote wildernesses have been preserved. Maintenance of any
status quo has become an increasingly attractive solution to many environmentalists. To me, Professor Meyers' analysis of 18th and 19th
century romanticism's nature-mysticism and the resulting "transvaluation of values"'" to elevate enjoyment of nature to enjoyment of God
illustrates the marginal legitimacy of much of contemporary environmental thinking with respect to preservation and aesthetics. Such thinking is often a naive and elegiac celebration of an irrelevant vision. As
Leo Marx observes in his masterful study of 19th century literature's
adaptation to technology, "What is important about the rural world [to
that century] . .. is not merely the agricultural ecoromy but its alleged
10 See J. PAssuopx,
attelpt.

:1 d. at 109.

MAN'S REsPoNsninrrY FoR NATURE

3-40 (1974), for such an
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moral, aesthetic, and in a sense metaphysical superiority to urban, commercial forces that threaten it."12
Intellectual hostility to urban life has great force. It is still argued
that the remaining unspoiled areas of this country symbolize our commitment to the values of freedom, innocence, courage, and strength and thus
reaffirm our national mission. A more accurate analysis of the late
19th century intellectual tradition's preoccupation with wilderness is
that assertion of those values was a way of coping with the guilt for
what we had to destroy to develop as a nation:
[W]hen their religious errand failed and no new social order
materialized . . . Americans began to question whether they any

longer had a mission of such importance that it merited tearing
down a wilderness. They began to ask whether they were corrupting their environment-but only after they discovered ... that their

environment had corrupted them. The wilderness that had served
them had also seduced them, and in destroying it, they destroyed
something of their hopes, something of their history, and something of the future as well as of the past ...
We had to act more or less as we did, but the recognition
of what we have done-it is guilt-is a great resource to us: it provides a more human and more satisfactory motivation than does the
simple pursuit of prosperity.'One would be tempted to conclude that having recognized the values
wilderness represents, wilderness itself need not be preserved to maintain
these values. Is it more important to have Thoreau's Walden or Walden
Pond? Professor Mark Sagoff, despite his analysis quoted above, has,
however, recently urged that the same reasons we preserve institutions
by honoring their procedures, as we have recently done with the House
Judiciary Committee hearings on the impeachment of President Nixon,
apply to preservation of the environment: "The obligation to preserve
nature, then, is an obligation to our cultural tradition to the values
we have cherished and in terms of which nature and this nation are still
to be described."1 4
To the extent that arguments such as Professor Sagoff's represent
a plea for recognition in the sense of consideration of aesthetic values,
they have validity. To borrow Musgrave's public finance terminology,
preservation of natural wonders and the promotion of aesthetics are
12 L. MARx, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN 99 (1964).
'L Sagoff, On Preserzing the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 231, 241 (1974)
(emphasis in original).

14Id. at 265.
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merit goods. Society should be entitled to provide them by passing
laws that withdraw resources from exploitation or by giving decisionmakers the discretion to adopt rules designed to promote aesthetic objectives in order to reinforce collective values deemed to be important.
Arguments such as Professor Sagoff's, however, go beyond pleas for
selective recognition of these values; they assert the primacy of these
values."0 At a deeper level, as Professor Meyers' analysis of Leopold and
the modern critics of technology demonstrates, the3e arguments lead to
a rejection of the incentives triggered by a system of private property
and ultimately to a rejection of reliance on technology and models of
rational choice as methods of conflict resolution."7
Recently Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard has been developing what seems to be a Neo-Hegelian alternative to classic utilitarianism,
or as he calls it, instrumental rationality. 8 The central principle of
our present rational decisionmaking models is that diverse values should
be reduced to a common denominator so that they can be compared and
ranked. Whenever possible, quantification is sought so that the relative
15See R. AMusGaAvE, THE
THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13-14 (1959). Granting that
wilderness should be preserved and aesthetic values recognized for reasons other than
the promotion of resource use efficiency, it does not follow that formal methods of rational choice such as cost-benefit analysis are irrelevant. The case for recognition of
these values is one for discretionary deviation from the norm of efficiency, not for their
substitution across the board for efficiency. See Robinson, Wilderness: The Last Frontier, 59 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1974).
10 Sagoff stands in sharp contrast to the views of most leg.l scholars, which are not
discussed, who have considered the question of whether we should recognize constitutional rights to a decent environment, e.g., Hanks & Hanks, The Right to a Habitable
Environment, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 146 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971). Klipsch, Aspects
of a ConstitutionalRight to a Habitable Environment: Toward an Environmental Due
Process,49 IND. L.J. 203 (1974), contains a good discussion of the problems and the cases
which have rejected the right. The most influential argument for the recognition of new
environmental rights expressly rejects raising environmental claims to the dignity of constitutional claims on the grounds the rights of the majority not minority are being
asserted. Professor Joseph Sax in his book, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN AcriON (1971), argues for the recognition of (xpanded rights of access
to the judicial system so that legislative and administrative choices can be subjected to
scrutiny. Although the book is highly ambiguous at crucial points as to whether substantive or procedural rights are being created, Sax seems to conclude ultimately that
the court's primary role is not to weigh the issues independently but to police the process
of administrative and legislative decision. "The principal function of courts in environmental matters is to restrain projects that have not been adequately planned and to insist that they not go forward unless and until those who can demonstrate that they have
considered, and adequately resolved, reasonable doubts about their consequences." Id. at
113.
17 See Large, This Land Is Whose Land? Changing ConccPts of Land as Property,
1973 XVis. L. REv. 1039.
18 Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfor Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). See also Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or
Ideology?, 2 PHm. & PuB. AFF. 66 (1972).
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values of alternative choices can be compared by a ranking procedure.
Tribe persuasively argues that the process of quantification inevitably
focuses on translating values into homocentric terms and that this results in two major distortions in terms of "higher" or environmental
values: (1) "an inchoate sense of obligation toward natural objects is
flattened into an aspect of self-interest," and (2) "value discontinuities
tend to be foreshortened."'"
A sense of obligation toward lower
creatures and innate physical objects, which he considers the foundation
of a new ethic, cannot develop as he prefers. Tribe's analysis flows
from his conclusion, widely shared, that the fatal defect in recent
Western thinking is the overemphasis on the means rather than the ends
of social choice with the result that reason has become void of ethical
insight. His critique of instrumental rationality and its necessary articulation of "environmental goals wholly in terms of human needs and
preferences" is a powerful philosophical critique of the limits of costbenefit analysis, but his attempts to sketch a positive philosophy for the
preservation of the natural environment is less impressive. Realizing
that all initial value preferences must of necessity be arbitrary, Tribe
seeks to create processes which will allow society to choose a new set
of values. But he also attempts to state the foundation of a new ethic.
Pagan animism is rejected, as is pantheism, in favor of a call for a
synthesis of transcendence (man's domination over nature through
reason) with immanence (a recognition that humanity is part of nature,
and natural order a constituent part of humanity). As we better identify
with plants and animals, we can move "'upward along the spiral of
moral evolution." I do not fully understand Tribe's analysis, but in
many ways it seems to be a reaffirmance of transcendentalism and a kind
of instrumental pantheism. just as Daphne fled Apollo, the god of
reason, by having her father transform her into a laurel, Tribe seems
to flee reason.
Ah, could I on some mountain height,
Roam in thy softly tender light,
Over the fields at twilight trail,
Drifting with spirits of hill and dale;
Then freed from knowledge and its pain,
Bathed inthy dew my health I'd gain."
So sighs Goethe's Faust in his opening monologue.
This perhaps overstates Tribe's position, for his ultimate proposal
19 Tribe, supra note 18, 83 YALE L.J. at 1332.
20 J.W. voN GoEtHa, FAUST pt 1, act I, scene I
Raphael transl. 1930).

[Nacht], lines 392-97, at 20 (A.
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is not a return to a simple set of first principles bcut a dynamic, noninstrumental process of choice./He expressly rejects pagan animism, for
example, because it is a statc concept which might well permanently
block the progress of those now underprivileged b-y "freezing the social
evolution of humanity into its contemporary mold." He hopes that
we will choose to respect animals and innate nature for its own sake,
but he does not demand it as does Sagoff.
The arguments of Tribe and Sagoff, different as they are,2' have
considerable force, particularly Tribe's. There is much about our current uses of technology that calls out for fundamental change. In
many respects the indiscriminate reliance on technology to solve resource use conflicts threatens to commit us to objectives which, upon
deeper reflection, should be questioned and rejected. Ultimately, however, one must question, as professor Meyers implicitly does, the desirability of making such ideas operational. Both the theses of Tribe and
Sagoff, particularly Sagoff's, have a tendency to raise a limited set of
values to an unwarranted primacy. Such thinking must be carefully
scrutinized because it is fundamentally inconsistent with democratic
values. The values that are represented under the banner of environmental protection are still too disparate to warrant an a priori decision
that they should always prevail in defined classes of conflicts. The incorporation of these values, which are unquestionably important, must be
much more selective than environmentalists suggest, and such incorporation must always take place within processes which weigh competing
values. It is for this reason that I would agree with Professor Meyers
that there is another answer to Tribe's question, which ends his article,
"Vho can fail to admit that the homocentric logic of self-interest leads
finally not to human satisfaction but to a loss of 1-,umanity ? ''22 In the
next section I will discuss the implications of Professor Meyers' analysis
for one such incorporation of environmental values, and in my comments on his affirmation of the relevance of economics I shall return to
the tension between environmental values and the traditional democratic
values of accomodating diverse interests.
ECOLOGY

The analysis of the second problem addressed, ecology, deals with
"I As Tribe puts it, "For him, the right policy is always th..
one to which society's
past, as revealed by the contemporary symbols of its values, inevitably points. For me,
the 'right' policy is one chosen not to imitate an idealized past but to seek, even tentatively, an imagined future." Tribe, From Environmental Foun'ations to Constitutional
Structures:
Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 556 (1975).
22
Tribe, supra note 18, 83 YALE L.J. at 1348.
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the tension between the descriptive function of science and the prescriptive function of law. As I will argue shortly, the teachings of ecology
provide a firmer basis for the recognition of environmental values than
does the wilderness philosophy of Leopold; but here too, as Professor
Meyers demonstrates, lawyers must be selective in their use of ecology.
Environmental lawyers seemed to have assumed that normative
rules of law can be derived from the basic teachings of ecology. This
assumption rests in turn on two further assumptions. First, ecology
can tell us if a given human activity causes harm. Second, ecology can
tell us which activities, and at what levels, are good and which are bad.
As Professor Meyers demonstrates in his analysis of Commoner's
The Closing Circle,2" these assumptions are overly simplistic. These assumptions rest in turn on the prediction of cause and effect relationships alien to science, and they reflect a confusion between the roles of the
scientist as truth seeker and social critic. As a lawyer-scientist has
recently written,
in ordinary usage a cause is a, necessary and sufficient precedent of
its effect. This sense of "causation," however, has little utility for
the scientist ....
[W]hat scientific analysis yields is simply a description of past experience ....
These results are almost always
expressed in terms of a quantitative relationship between an independent variable (a "cause") and its dependent variable (the
"effect") 24
Further, these statements as to the magnitudes of effects are morally
neutral for they are descriptive rather than normative.
Scientific information alone cannot be the basis of prescriptive rules
since a human activity such as the discharge of residuals into an ecosystem becomes injurious or harmful only after society decides that the
benefits of the activity do not outweigh the consequences we do not
prefer.2" Scientific information is a necessary condition for the identification and, generally, the solution of what we decide are problems,
but it is not a sufficient one. Thus, as Professor Meyers argues, normative prohibitions cannot be so neatly derived from ecology as Commoner
suggests, because ecological problems are social problems; and thus the
costs and benefits of a solution must be considered before we can decide
2s B. CoMMoNER, THE CLOSING CmCLE (1972).

24Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in the
Formulationof Public Health Policies,62 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1084, 1097 (1974). For another
discussion of the problems of using ecological data to formulate environmental policy,
see Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48
S. CAL. L. REv. 371 (1974).
2
5 See J. PAssmoRn, supra note 10, at 43-47.
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whether we want to eliminate or modify an activity or merely consider the consequences a cost to be borne by society. The concept of
damnum absque injuriahas wide application.
There is also a further problem with the derivation of normative
concepts from ecology which Professor Meyers does not stress. That
is the lack of available scientific information on which to base accurate
predictions about the impact of an activity. Even if we did decide to
prohibit all activities which approached some predetermined level of
ecosystem modification, science simply cannot now provide us with
precise enough information about the consequences. It can often, at best,
suggest the dimensions of risks to which we will be subjected. In short,
ecology often cannot even tell us the price of the lunch.
The difficulties of extrapolating social solutions from science do
not mean we should disregard the basic principles of ecology. I agree
with Professor Meyers' criticisms of Commoner but not with all of the
implications he draws from them. There is much more force to the
basic insights of ecology than he is willing to concede. After a masterful
survey of man's attitude toward nature, beginning with the call of
Genesis to multiply, replenish and subdue the earth, the Australian
philosopher John Passmore wisely concludes:
But without sentimentality, without recourse to metaphysics, we can
still recognize that it is better to look first at the way things happen
in nature and help them to work more effectively than to try to
ride rough-shod over them merely in order to demonstrate the superiority of a rationality defined in wholly mathematical, or wholly
economic, terms.26
Historically the law has favored resource exploitation. While intellectuals were contemplating the mystery of nature, the law was creating a presumption, loosely defined, that in the long run and the short run,
the benefits of an activity outweighed any adverse consequences. Uncertainty problems were solved in part by this presumption and by casting
the burden on those objecting to the activity to establish that the adverse
consequences would in fact occur. Injury was defined in terms of events
that occurred or would occur within a relatively short time. Ecology
suggests that the 19th century presumption in favor of exploitation,
e.g., modification of ecosystems, be replaced by one of caution before
an activity is allowed. In short, our previous faith in technology and
development must be leavened. For the reasons suggested previously,
the presumption should not, however, be replaced with one in favor of
26 Id. at 39.
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preservation, for that would give undue weight to environmental values.
What is needed are procedures and rules which assess the impact of activities before they are allowed and shift to the initiator some of the
burden of demonstrating that the impacts of the activity are desirable.
These changes, which are underway in a nonsystematic fashion, should
not be characterized in traditional burden-of-proof terms. Procedural
devices such as the allocation of the risk of nonpersuasion and the use of
presumptions are employed to permit a decision when the mind of the
trier in the case is in equipoise on all the evidence. It is scientifically
impossible to either prove or disprove that a risk will materialize, so a
shift in the burden of persuasion would result in a change in a substantive rule. In many cases this would result in the unwarranted prohibition of a societally useful activity. Instead, a presumption of caution
should be developed to require (1) the initiator of an action to display impact and risk information (this is not analogous to the burden of
producing evidence, for the failure to produce should not always result
in loss of the case) and (2) to allow the decisionmaker, be it judge or
administrator, the discretion to incorporate a margin of safety into traditional notions of cause and injury."
The incorporation of this presumption into the legal system will
require modification of existing doctrines such as the requirement that
imminent irreparable injury be established as a precondition to injunctive
or related relief. The recent litigation against Reserve Mining's discharge of taconite tailings into Lake Superior illustrates the uneven
progress of modification. Initially, a state court trial resulted in a finding that the discharges produced only minor modifications of the lake
and thus did not constitute pollution, since any inferences as to damage
to the lake would be speculative." The federal government then filed
suit on the grounds that, inter alia, the discharge was a public nuisance
under federal common law. Subsequently it was discovered that the discharges contained amosite asbestos, which exposed the citizens of
Duluth, who got their water from the lake, to risks of cancer and other
diseases, and the complaint was amended to allege a health hazard. After
a lengthy trial with the presentation of sophisticated, contested but fragmentary scientific evidence on the alleged health hazards, the district
court enjoined the operation of the plant on the grounds that it constituted a public nuisance under federal and state law." Reserve's de22 See Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 24, at 412-27, for a fuller analysis of this problem.
28
Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 2 E.R.C. 1135 (Minn.
Dist Ct 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972).
"eUnitedStates v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. May 11, 1974),
injunction stayed, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. June 4, 1974), applicationto vacate stay denied.
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fense that a threshold level of injury had not been established was
rejected on the grounds that there was no known level of safe exposure
and thus "to permit the present exposure to continue is nothing more
than a gamble with the hopes that the threshold level, if there is one,
has not been or will not be reached.""0 Reserve's defense that injunctive relief was not proper because there was no evidence to date that
anybody has been seriously injured was similarly rejected on the grounds
that the "sanctity of human life is of too great value to this court"'" to
require a showing that the discharges result in a statistically significant
number of deaths. An injunction was granted after the court concluded
that abatement was economically and technologically feasible. The
Government's introduction of evidence on public health hazards made
the case easier, for it was no longer making, direct y, the radical claim
that Lake Superior should be protected per se but was arguing by
analogy to the fundamental principle that human beings should not be
injured. Nonetheless the trial judge's willingness to accept the scientific
evidence of hazards, which was based on inferences drawn from diverse
research projects, is a major recognition of risk of future injury-as
opposed to demonstrable harm-as a basis for prohibiting an activity;
and it represents a substantial liberalization of the traditional standards
of proof of harm. All scientific inferences are simply educated speculations, and it would have been easy for the court to set a standard of
proof of harm too high to be satisfied by the existing state of knowledge. Reserve Mining was able to establish that it was impossible to
predict on scientific grounds that there will be an increased incidence of
cancer in the population of Duluth by virtue of their exposure to asbestiform fibers in the air and water. The court accepted the statement of a
medical witness that because information as to what would happen was
418 U.S. 911 (July 9, 1974), supplemental opinion recommending reinstatement of injunction, 380 F. Supp. 11, 71 (D. Alinn. Aug. 3, 1974), application to vacate or modify stay
denied, 419 U.S. 802 (Oct. 11, 1974), injunction modified, case rcmanded, F.2d ,
7 E.R.C. 1618 (8th Cir. Mar. 14, 1975). An important adminisfrative decision prohibiting a substance because of carcinogenic risks is In re Shell Chem;cal, 6 E.R.C. 2047 (Environmental Protection Agency FIFRA Nos. 145 et al. 1974). The issue was whether
the registration for Aldrin-Dieldrin, a chemical pesticide, shouk be suspended. A suspension order, which resembles a preliminary injunction, requires a finding that continued
usage poses an imminent hazard to man or the environment. The administrative law
judge held on the basis of expert testimony that it was permissible to extrapolate from
laboratory experiments on mice that the chemicals posed a risl: of cancer in humans.
Shell's criteria for such an extrapolation, which included inter alia at least one incident
of cancer that is compound-related, were rejected because the demimds "are practically impossible to meet." 6 E.R.C. at 2055. The District of Columl ia Circuit affirmed the
suspension order, finding substantial evidence in support. Envircnmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cic. 1975).
80 380 F. Supp. at 47.

31 Id. at 54.
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unavailable "using techniques that would be acceptable to the medical
community,"' 2 the carcinogens should be removed pending further research.
The Eighth Circuit stayed the injunction pending a resolution of
the merits on the condition that Reserve act promptly to abate the discharges,"' but the court's reasoning seems to undercut much of the risk
analysis of the district court and thus is a disturbing precedent. Judge
Bright, in reviewing the evidence, placed great emphasis on the limited
available knowledge about impact and on the methodological problem of
the various research studies. To the court, a review of the medical
testimony compelled the conclusion that:
[A]lthough Reserve's discharges represent a possible medical
danger, they have not in this case been proven to amount to a
health hazard. The discharges may or may not result in detrimental
health effects, but, for the present, that is simply unknown. The relevant legal question is thus, what manner of judicial cognizance may
be taken of the unknown.
We do not think that a bare risk of the unknown can amount to
proof in this case. Plaintiffs have failed to prove that a demonstrable health hazard exists. This failure, we hasten to add, is not reflective of any weakness which it is within their power to cure, but
rather, given the current state of medical and scientific knowledge,
plaintiffs' case is based only on medical hypothesis and is simply
beyond proof.
We believe that Judge Lord carried his analysis one step beyond
the evidence. Since testimony clearly established that an assessment
of the risk was made impossible by the absence of medical knowledge, Judge Lord apparently took the position that all uncertainties
should be resolved in favor of health safety. Since the appropriate
threshold level for safe toleration of fibers was unknown, the district court tipped the balance in favor of attempting to protect against
the unknown and simply assumed that Reserve's discharge presents
a health hazard. In doing so, he disregarded the tissue studies of
his own experts which provided direct evidence to the contrary. If
we are correct in our conclusion that evidence does not exist in the
record on which to find Reserve's discharges to be unsafe, the district
court's determination to resolve all doubts in favor of health safety
represents a legislative policy judgment, not a judicial one. See
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Hodgson, [499
F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ].34
The court was not unsympathetic to the risks posed to the citizens of
82Id. at 51.
83 Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974).

al Id. at 1083-84.
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Duluth, but considered itself constrained to deal with the problem:
"[W]e are a court of law, governed by rules of proof, and unknowns
may not be substituted for proof of a demonstrable hazard to the public
health."3
After the Supreme Court denied two requests to vacate the stay,3 6
the Eighth Circuit reached the merits.17 This time Judge Bright displayed a high level of sensitivity to the need to apply a risk-benefit analysis to a dispute that lay on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and
backed somewhat but not totally away from his earlier preliminary
assessment of the merits. Reserve's discharges were found to constitute
pollution under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, but the company was given a reasonable time to develop an
abatement plan because an immediate injunction was not justified, given
the balance between the unpredictable health effects and the consequences
of closing the plant. The court construed section 1160(g) of the
FWPCA, which requires the United States to establish that a discharge
which violates a state water quality standard is also "endangering the
health or welfare of persons."3 Judge Bright concluded that Congress
used "endangering" in a precautionary and preventative sense, and
held:
The record shows that Reserve is discharging a substance into
Lake Superior waters which under an acceptable but unproved
medical theory may be considered as carcinogenic. As previously
discussed, this discharge gives rise to a reasonable medical concern
over the public health. We sustain the district courl's determination
that Reserve's discharge into Lake Superior constitutes pollution
of waters "endangering the health or welfare of persons" within
the terms of §§ 1160(c) (5) and (g) (1) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and is subject to abatement. 3

The Eighth Circuit's acceptance of a risk-benefit analysis to define pollution under the Federal Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 is a recognition of the need for new concepts of cause and harm.
3 Id. at 1084. But see id., 380 F. Supp. 11, 89-90 (suppleriental opinion). For a
more serious example of the rigidities of existing concepts of cau ;e and injury, see Ethyl
Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, F.2d -,
7 E.R.C. 1353 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 28, 1975) (EPA committed a "clear error of judgment" in concluding lead in the
air was a health hazard).
36418 U.S. 911 (July 9, 1974), aff'g stay granted in 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. June 4,
1974); supplemental opinion, 380 F. Supp. 11, 71 (D. finn. Aug. 3, 1974), application to
vacate or modify stay denied, 419 U.S. 802 (Oct. 11, 1974) (directing circuit court to
reach decision on merits by Jan. 31, 1975).
37-

F.2d -,

7 E.R.C. 1618 (8th Cir.

3'33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(1) (1970).

1,-

F.2d at -,

7 E.R.C. at 1643.

far. 14, 1975).
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However, the court drew a sharp distinction between the power of Congress to decide what risks society should bear and the power of a court
to make these decisions under common law standards of liability. Judge
Bright suggested that it would be "unwise" as well as unnecessary to
rely on federal nuisance law. This distinction represents too narrow
a view of the court's discretion to prohibit an activity when its ultimate
impact is uncertain. Current concepts of hazard still require a showing
that identifiable injuries will occur within a relatively close time horizon,
but this definition of hazard rests in part on the assumption that future
risks will in fact turn out to be minimal because society will find a way
to deal with the problem.4" It is true that a legislature or administrative
agency may have more power to conclude that an activity is a risk, but
this should in no way limit the power of a court to expand concepts
such as cause-in-fact, hazard, and imminent irreparable harm to permit
a risk-benefit analysis. As the lower court opinion illustrates, such an
analysis can be made with all the procedural rigors necessary to constitute proof. In the endeavor to fashion rules which require scrutiny
of the side effects of an activity and an expansion of concepts of cause,
harm, and injury, reference to the basic teachings of ecology, that
modifications of natural systems are suspect, is one of the incremental
adaptations to changing social needs; and, as Cardozo argued, it is
proper for the common law to respond to these adaptations 4' simultaneously with legislatures and administrative agencies. Because the opportunity costs of foregoing the use of a resource are likely to be substantial, a homocentric perspective should be maintained in expanding the
definitions of harm and injury. I do not believe, however, that this perspective is incompatible with recognition that our continued productive
use of resources can be threatened in ways we do not fully understand,
and thus we need to be more cautious than we have been in the past
before we begin to exploit."
40 See Note, Imminent IrreparableInjury: A Need for Reform, 45 S. CAL. L. Rnv.
1025, 1030-37 (1972). Cf. Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revohution, 3 J.
LEGAL STUDIES

41

403 (1974).

B. CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
Rules distinguishing between compensable and incompensable consequential damages are judicial creations "founded upon necessity." Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co., 233 U.S. 546, 555 (1914). Justice Pitney characterized the rule granting railroads
immunity for incidental damages as "so well established that it amounts to a rule of
property, and should be modified, if at all, only by the law-making power." Id. at 555. An
analysis of when an expectation is protected under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
is beyond the scope of this comment. The accepted rationale for protecting such exp ctations is that there has been reliance on their continued recognition and that no notice of
the likelihood of nonrecognition was given. It is, at a minimum, reasonable to conclude
that a discharger such as Reserve Mining was on notice that new information might dis42

1975]

COMMENT ON MEYERS' 'INTRODUCTION'

469

ECONOnnTcs
Professor Meyers finds the final branch of learning he surveys,
economics, to be the most promising for the integration of environmental
values into the calculus of interests relevant to the solution of resource
use conflicts. Lawyers currently find economics a useful way of analyzing the policy choices implicit in legal doctrines, for it allows one to
describe systematically the costs and benefits of alternative policies.
Beyond this it is natural that a lawyer would find welfare economics,
properly understood, congenial, for economics is n. process for accommodating a great variety of competing human desires. It is also a process which can meet the lawyers' test of process legitimacy-fairness
in the sense of consistency with democratic valves. The pursuit of
efficiency as a societal objective can be defended on the grounds of
fairness as the distinguished economist E. J. Misian has argued:
[A] theory of welfare economics might be dev eloped from the
democratic process. If the latter operates not as a majority-rule
decision mechanism-justified on the cynical view that, in the last
resort, it is better to count heads than to break them-but rather
as a method of reaching agreement through informed debate, then
indeed the principles by which broad categories of decisions are
reached becomes relevant. For if consensus is reached through
informed debate on certain sorts of issues, the existence of a common context of aspirations must be presumed. There is then
likely to emerge a search for consistency in decision-taking on such
issues, one that will tend to promote a common set of criteria. One
such range of issues would comprehend certain kinds of economic
problems, and the criteria sought for would be of an allocative
nature. The incentive for discovering such criteria is, of course,
economic. Once formulated, the implications of certain kinds of
economic measures need not be debated at great length: they can
be judged directly by reference to these allocative or 'welfare'
criteria which, over time, will acquire a sort of con stitutional status.
In such an idealized democracy one might hope that time and intelligence would throw up those welfare propositions by which
economists today seek to justify their prescriptive statements.43
Nonetheless the final section of Professor Meiers' article will be
the most controversial, for his affirmation of neoclassical economics
rejects the arguments that the moral and scientific imperatives of environmentalism are overriding. The issue in the clash between many
close a public health hazard. Prohibition of activities on other grounds such as aesthetics

raises more serious constitutional questions, since the change in expectations is more
sudden.
43 E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 310-11 (1971).
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environmentalists and economists is, as the article indicates, the proper
role of the government in providing for environmental quality. Professor Meyers endorses the neoclassical role of the government, which
limits intervention to the assignment and enforcement of property rights
and the correction of allocation distortions caused by the existence of
externalities. The neoclassical arguments are powerful ones with broad
applicability to resource use conflicts, but their relevance to all environmental problems bears more scrutiny than Professor Meyers suggests. The basic rationale for government intervention under the neoclassical view is the need to encourage the internalization of external
costs which distort the efficient allocation of resources. But the concept of an external cost is not self-defining. The welfare economics
literature has been more concerned with explaining the consequences
of the presence of externalities than with exploring the assumptions that
lie behind the notion that the side effect of an activity is an external
cost. The basic notion of cost, as used by welfare economists, is the
value a person must presently forego when one alternative use of resources is preferred over another. This concept enables one to calculate
costs and benefits only in terms of values society has previously assigned to alternative resource uses. Thus, current concepts of cost
provide an incomplete basis on which to conclude that society should
or should not tolerate the side effects of an activity.
A further problem with reliance on present techniques of welfare
economics analysis is that the press toward quantification so powerfully
criticized in the work of Professor Laurence Tribe, discussed earlier,"
levels to significant value distortions particularly when questions of risk
are concerned. The limitations inherent in current conceptions of cost
make it difficult to analyze all environmental problems in the framework
suggested by Professor Meyers. What works beautifully for air and
water pollution and perhaps land use control may not work, for example,
for the breeder reactor. For example, the distinguished economist
Allen Kneese, who labeled the fast breeder reactor a "Faustian liargain," did so as he testified that the problem was not one that could
be analyzed within conventional cost-benefit analysis. He called
instead for a national debate on energy policy with a resulting "political"
choice among alternative sources." However, despite these criticisms, I
-4 See notes 18-19 supra & text accompanying.
4 See E. HANKS, A. TARLoCK & 3. HANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENvnoNMENTAL LAW AND PoLIcY 425-26 (1974), quoting Kneese, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Unscheduled Events in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Comment on Environmental Survey of Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Power Reactor Licensing Rule Making, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
Nov. 1972 (undated memorandum).
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believe Professor Meyers is right to prefer the principles of welfare
economics to the other value systems he surveys. As Mishan has suggested, welfare economics, for all its limitations, provides a structure
in which rational debate over resource use priorities can occur. It is
no mean achievement that aggregates of preferences can be reduced
to a common denominator.
CONCLUSION

An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and
Some Criticisms is an important contribution to environmental law.
The article is a thoughtful call for the integration of environmental
values into the existing calculus of values relevant to the resolution
of resource use conflicts. It is also a rejection of the need for a radical
new ethic of resource use as opposed to the more gradual and selective
recognition of new values. The accommodation of environmental and
developmental values is a formidable one, and this article contributes
to the process by clarifying many of the important issues that must
now be faced, regardless of whether one agrees with all of Professor
Meyers' conclusions.

